

Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-02

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-02 /005 R

66618

DRAFTED BY EUR/EE WSSHEPARD:DK

APPROVED BY EURX/EE JABAKER

ACDA - THIRSHHFELD

EUR/RPM - VLEHOVICH

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S E C R E T STATE 242551

FOLLOWING VIENNA 10073 ACTION SECSTATE SECDEF WASHDC INFO BONN
LONDON GENEVA USMISSION NATO USNMR SHAPE USCINCEUR DEC 6TH.

QUOTE

S E C R E T VIENNA 10073

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL, NOTE PARA. 11

FROM USREP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP
MEETING, DEC 5, 1973

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. AD HOC GROUP HEARD REPORT FROM UK REP (ROSE)
ON ORAL REPORT HE HAD DELIVERED TO NAC DEC 3, HEARD
REPORTS ON BILATERALS, AND DISCUSSED PACT STATEMENTS IN DEC 5
PLENARY (VIENNA 10026 AND VIENNA 10028) AND SOME OF THE
QUESTIONS THEY RAISED REGARDING ALLIED TACTICS. UK REP REPORTED
THAT THE NAC HAD RECEIVED HIS REPORT WELL, AND HAD HAD A USEFUL
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DISCUSSION OF THE MAJOR ISSUES, NOTABLY CONSTRAINTS AND HOW TO
MOVE AHEAD IN JAN. BILATERALS REPORTED INCLUDED MEETINGS OF US
REPS WITH BULGARIAN AND HUNGARIAN REPS, MEETINGS OF NORWEGIAN
REP AND CANADIAN REP WITH SOVIET REP KHLESTOV AND SOVIET DEPREP

SMIRNOVSKIY RESPECTIVELY, AND MEETINGS OF SEVERAL REPS WITH ROMANIAN REP POPESCU. REPORTS INDICATED SOVIETS WERE PLACING INCREASING EMPHASIS ON LINK TO STAGE TWO AS THE MOST TROUBLING ASPECT OF ALLIED PROPOSAL. DISCUSSION OF ALLIED TACTICS FOCUSED UPON QUESTION OF HOW BEST TO EXPLOIT THIS APPARENT SOVIET INTEREST AND GROUP AGREED TO ALLOCATE ITS MEETINGS OF DEC 13 AND DEC 14 TO A DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONS FOR CAPITALS TO CONSIDER DURING CHRISTMAS RECESS CONCERNING HOW TO PROCEED IN JAN. GROUP ALSO REVISED AND APPROVED CHAIRMAN'S REPORT (REVISED TEXT SEPTTEL). END SUMMARY.

2. UK REP REPORTED THAT ON DEC 3 HE (ACCOMPANIED BY CANADIAN REP GRANDE AND GREEK REP DONTAS) HAD REPORTED ORALLY TO THE NAC ALONG THE LINES AGREED PREVIOUSLY BY THE AD HOC GROUP. SYG LUNS HAD PRAISED THE WRITTEN REPORT, AND AT HIS SUGGESTION IT WAS MADE INTO A SEPARATE DOCUMENT FOR MINISTERS INSTEAD OF AN ANNEX TO THE REPORT OF THE PERM REPS. LUNS HAD SAID THAT HIS COVERING MINUTE WOULD EMPHASIZE THE COHESION AND EFFECTIVE CONSULTATION AMONG THE ALLIES THAT HAD CHARACTERIZED THE AD HOC GROUP.

3. THE DISCUSSION OF THE ORAL REPORT BY THE NAC WAS, IN UK REP'S VIEW, USEFUL BECAUSE THE NAC UNDERSTANDS THE PROBLEMS OF MBFR BETTER THAN IT HAS IN THE PAST. THE NAC HAD FOCUSED NOT UPON DETAILS, BUT UPON THE ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS OF WHERE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD GO FROM HERE, AND WHAT THE NAC COULD DO TO BE HELPFUL. THE MAIN CONCERN OF THE NAC WAS THE ENTIRE ISSUE OF STABILIZING MEASURES. UK REP HAD EMPHASIZED THAT IF THE ALLIES WISHED TO MAINTAIN THEIR INTENTION OF SEEKING PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES, AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED SOON ON THE DETAILS, AND THE TITLES WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED AND PRESENTED TO THE EAST PRIOR TO THE CHRISTMAS RECESS. UK REP HAD URGED THE NAC TO AUTHORIZE THE WEST TO ADD SOME DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY ON STABILIZING MEASURES (AS COMPARED TO WHAT WAS IN THE OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS) IN THE DEC 11 PLENARY STATEMENT, EVEN IF NO DETAILS AND NO FIRM STATEMENT ABOUT THE TIMING OF THESE MEASURES COULD BE GIVEN. HE GATHERED FROM THE NAC DISCUSSIONS THAT WHILE THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT HIS REQUEST WOULD
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BE MET, IT WAS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN.

4. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN A DISCUSSION ON HOW THE ALLIES WOULD MOVE AHEAD IN JAN. UK REP HAD PARRIED THE QUESTIONS AND TEMPORIZED, MAINTAINING THAT THE MATTER WOULD NEED FURTHER STUDY. THE EAST WOULD ALSO BE RETURNING TO CAPITALS FOR INSTRUCTIONS OVER CHRISTMAS, AND THERE WAS NO WAY OF TELLING WHAT THESE WOULD BE. UK REP HAD ALSO BEEN STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT SYG LUNS TWICE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE TALKS MIGHT BE BROKEN OFF -- THE FIRST TIME HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE DONE UNLESS THE PACT SHOWED SOME FLEXIBILITY AFTER THE RECESS, AND THE SECOND TIME HE OBSERVED THAT IF TALKS WERE BROKEN OFF, THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO BE SURE THAT THEIR POSITION WOULD STAND UP TO PUBLIC SCRUTINY.

TO RHE RELIEF OF THE UK REP, NIETHER REMARK WAS TAKEN UP FOR DISCUSSION. THE NAC HAD AGREED TO JAN 25 AS THE DATE FOR THE NEXT ORAL REPORT FROM THE AD HOC GROUP.

5. CANADIAN REP ADDED THAT HIS IMPRESSION HAD BEEN THAT IN ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF "THINKING AHEAD," THE NAC HAD HAD IN MIND SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES AS WELL AS TACTICAL QUESTIONS. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT SY LUNS'COVERING MINUTE TO THE GROUP REPORT WOULD STATE THAT NO MINISTERIAL DECISIONS WERE REQUIRED.

6. NETHERLANDS REP (QUARLES) OBSERVED THAT THE QUESTION OF TACTICS FOR JAN WAS VERY IMPORTANT. THE GROUP SHOULD DEVOTE A MEETING PRIOR TO THE RECESS TO DISCUSSING AND DEFINING THE QUESTIONS WHICH CAPITALS SHOULD BE ASKED TO ADDRESS OVER CHRISTMAS. THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ONES OF TACTICS, RATHER THAN OF EVENTUAL SUBSTANTIVE FALLBACKS OR CHANGES. TACTICAL QUESTIONS WOULD INCLUDE THE OBJECTIVES THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE IN THE MONTH OF JAN: WHAT SUBJECTS TO TRY TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE ON, HOW TO GET THE PACT TO DISCUSS THEM, WHAT ISSUES TO SET ASIDE, WHAT POINTS TO MAKE. THE GROUP SHOULD ALSO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHAT NEGOTIATING FORUMS WOULD BE USED, AND THE DESIRABLE RHYTHM OF PLENARIES. NETHERLANDS REP SUGGESTED THAT THE US MIGHT PREPARE A DISCUSSION PAPER ON THESE SUBJECTS FOR THE GROUP TO ADDRESS. TURKISH REP (TUREL) AGREED, SUGGESTING THAT GROUP MIGHT USEFULLY ASSESS FOR CAPITALS THE EVENTS OF THE FIRST SIX WEEKS AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE OTHER SIDE AS WELL AS THE TACTICS TO PURSUE. US REP AGREED TO PREPARE SUCH A PAPER, AND GROUP AGREED
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TO SET ASIDE ITS MEETINGS OF DEC. 13 AND QR TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTION
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7. US REP DESCRIBED A LUNCH ON DEC 5 WITH THE BULGARIAN REP (DICHEV) AND BULGARIAN DELOFF (COL. STOIMENOV). DICHEV HAD STATED EXPLICITLY THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HOPED A SUCCESFUL MBFR NEGOTIATION WOULD SET A PRECEDENT FOR A SUBSEQUENT ROUND OF FORCE REDUCTION TALKS FOCUSING ON THE BALKANS. COL STOIMENOV SUGGESTED THAT ONCE GENERAL POLITICAL AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED, TECHNICAL, I.E., MILITARY, PEOPLE COULD RAPIDLY WORK OUT THE PRACTICAL DETAILS OF A PROTOCOL, DESPITE THE ADMITTED COMPLEXITY OF COMPARING DIFFERENT EQUIPMENT, WHICH IN ANY CASE COULD BE DONE AS REGARDS THE MILITARY FUNCTION SERVED BY INDIVIDUAL ITEMS EVEN IF THESE VARIED TECH- NICALLY. WHEN THE US REPS DESCRIBED THE DIFFICULTIES OF SUCH AN APPROACH, DICHEV APPEARED TO HAVE SOME APPRECIATION FOR THEIR ARGUMENTS. BOTH BULGARIAN REPS CLAIMED THAT NOT TO REDUCE THE BUNDESWEHR WHILE REDUCING SOVIET FORCES WOULD HARM EASTERN SECURITY, BUT WERE NOT WILLING TO CLAIM, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, THAT BULGARIAN SECURITY WOULD BE DIRECTLY HARMED BY A US-SOVIET REDUCTION OMITTING THE BUNDESWEHR. GREEK REP NOTED THAT WXPPLICIT BULGARIAN SUPPORT FOR BALKAN FORCE REDUCTION TALKS SEEMED A NEW DEPARTURE, SINCE DICHEV HAD REITERATED TO HIM IN GENERAL

TERMS LESS THAN A WEEK AGO THAT BULGARIA WOULD BE OUT OF ANY POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS.

8. US REP ALSO REPORTED ON A LUNCH DEC 6 WITH HUNGARIAN REP PETRAN. PETRAN THOUGHT THE PLENARIES HAVE BEEN TOO ACADEMIC IN FORMAT AND BELIEVED THE TALKS SHOULD MOVE TO A MORE PRODUCTIVE FORMAT, EMPHASIZING BILATERALS. COMMENT: PETRAN MENTIONED BILATERALS SPECIFICALLY BUT HIS SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION INDICATED THAT HE HAD IN MIND THE MORE DIRECT EXCHANGE WHICH TOOK PLACE IN EMISSARY CONTACTS DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS. END COMMENT. PETRAN SAID HE WANTED US REP TO

KNOW THAT HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO RESPOND STRONGLY EACH TIME THE ALLIES RAISED THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE. HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO RESPOND EVERY SINGLE TIME AND ON THE SPOT, EVEN RAISING A POINT OF ORDER IF NECESSARY TO DO SO. HE HAD TOLD MINISTRY THIS WOULD BE EXTREME PROCEDURE NOT IN KEEPING WITH STYLE OF VIENNA TALKS. BUT HE WISHED ON PRESENT
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OCCASION TO EXPRESS HOPE OF HIS AUTHORITIES THAT ALLIES WOULD NOT PLACE SO MUCH EMPHASIS ON HUNGARIAN ISSUE. THE US REP SAID THE ALLIES WOULD RAISE ISSUE AT A TIME OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, BUT IN THE MEANTIME WOULD STAY WITH THEIR PRESENT POSITION OF RESERVING RIGHT TO DO SO. HUNGARIAN REP ASKED WHEN ALLIES MIGHT CONTEMPLATE RAISING HUNGARIAN ISSUE IN SPECIFIC SENSE. US REP SAID THIS WOULD BE AT TIME OF ALLIES CHOOSING BUT HE COULD GIVE NO DETAIL. THE US REP PROBED FOR INDICATIONS OF ANY INDEPENDENT HUNGARIAN INTEREST IN INCLUSION IN ANY MBFR MEASURES AND RECEIVED THE REPLY THAT THERE WAS NO INTEREST IN PARTICIPATING IN ANY ASPECT. PETRAN INDICATED THE EASTERN REPS MET AN AVERAGE OF ONCE A WEEK. FRG REP SAID HE HAD HAD INDICATIONS THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MET MORE FREQUENTLY.

9. FRG REP DESCRIBED A MEETING BETWEEN FRG DEPREP (HOFMANN) AND ROMAINIAN REP POPESCU. POPESCU PROFESSED HIMSELF TO BE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE PROVISIONS FOR STORING EQUIPMENT OF WITHDRAWN US TROOPS IN THE WESTERN PROPOSAL; SUCH ASYMMETRY IN THE EQUIPMENT PROVISIONS APPLIED TO US AND TO SOVIET WITHDRAWALS WAS NOT POSSIBLE. HE SAID THE WEST SHOULD KEEP OPEN THE IDEA OF MUTUAL DIS-BANDMENT OF WITHDRAWN SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES. POPESCU EXPRESSED A STRONG INTEREST IN ASSOCIATED MEASURES. HE OPPOSED ANY FORMAL ROLE FOR THE MILITARY ALLIANCES IN APPLICATION OF ANY SUCH MEASURES, SUCH AS TRANSMITTAL OF PRE-ANNOUNCEMENTS, ETC. ALSO, THE MEASURES SHOULD APPLY TO A WIDER AREA, SO ROMANIA COULD PROFIT FROM THEM. POPESCU SAID SOME SPECIFIC ROMANINA PROPOSALS MIGHT BE MADE AFTER NEW YEAR'S (TOPIC WAS NOT MENTIONED). UK REP SAID POPESCU HAD CALLED ON UK DEPREP GOODALL. POPESCU ASKED IF THE WEST INTENDED TO PRESENT MORE DETAILED GENERAL PROPOSALS, AND WAS TOLD NO. POPESCU REFERRED TO THE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFICULT EASTERN AND WESTERN APPROACHES AND ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY WESTERN FLEXIBILITY. GOODALL REPLIES APPROPRIATELY.

POPESCU REITERATED THE STANDARD EASTERN POSITION ON THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES, BUT WHEN GOODALL RESPONDED, POPESCU SAID THESE COUNTER ARGUMENTS WERE STRONG AND USEFUL. POPESCU ASKED ABOUT PROTECTIO OF THE SECURITY OF EUROPEAN NON-PARTICIPANTS. GOODALL REFERRED TO THE WESTERN OPENING STATEMENTS. POPESCU SAID THE ROMAINIANS DID NOT INTEND TO PRESS THEIR IDEAS OF NON-PARTICIPANT OBSERVERS, BUT STILL FAVORED THE IDEAS OF PUBLIC DECLARATIONS OF INTENT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF NON-PARTICIPANTS AND TO KEEP THEM INFORMED. GOODALL REPLIED THAT SECRET

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THIS WOULD CAUSE NEEDLESS COMPLICATION, DIVERT THE FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND NOT EFFECTVELY SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE NON-PARTICIPANTS. POPESCU SAID ROMANIA INTENDED TO MMAKE A SUBSTANTIAL STATEMENT BUT FIRST WISHED TO PROBE VIEWS OF WEST; THE STATEMENT WULD PROBABLY NOT COME BEFORE THE CHRISTMAS BREAK. POPESCU EMPHASIZED ROMANIAN DETACHMENT FROM THE PROPOSALS OF BOTH SIDES. FRG REP NOTED POPESCU HAD TAKEN A SIMILAR ATTITUDE WITH FRG DEPREP, STRESSING THAT ROMANIA HAD NOT ENDORSED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. GREEK REP SAID POPESCU HAD TAKEN THIS STAND WITH HIM AS WELL.

10 CANADIAN REP REPORTED ON A LUNCH WITH SOVIET DEPREP SMIRNOVSKIY, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS LOW-KEY. SMIRNOVSKIY REITERATED THE EASTERN POSITIONS ON REDUCTION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES AND ON THE INCLUSION OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. HE SAID THAT EVERYTHING MIGHT NOT HAVE TO BE AGREED ON AT ONCE; A FEW THINGS COULD BE LEFT FOR LATER. SMIRNOVSKIY SAID ONLY ASSOCIATED MEASURES RELATED TO REDUCTIONS WERE ACCEPTABLE, AND HE INDICATED INTEREST IN DETAILS OF PHASE 2 OF ALLIED APPROACH, CHARACTERIZING THE WESTERN PROPOSED SECOND PHASE IN ITS PRESENT GUISE AS A PIG-IN-A-POKE. THE CANADIAN REP ANSWERED THAT IT WOULD BE THIS FOR THE WEST AS WELL; DETAILS SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE SECOND PHASE ITSELF. SMIRNOVSKIY OPINED THAT THE VAGUENESS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY RESERVATON WAS BECAUSE THE EC STATES THEMSELVES DIDN'T KNOW WHAT THEY WANTED. HE DID NOT DISAGREE WHEN GRANDE SAID EASTERN SECURITY WOULD NOT BE HARMED BY THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. SMIRNOVSKIY SAID HE WAS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER HE WOULD RETURN TO VIENNA IN JANUARY.

11. NORWEGIAN ACTING REP (VAERNO) REPORTED ON A DINNER AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY GIVEN BY SOVIET REP KHLESTOV FOR THE NORWEGIAN REP (LUNDE). KHLESTOV EXPRESSED OPTIMISM ABOUT CSCE PROGRESS AND SAID IT MIGHT END ITS SECOND PHASE IN APRIL OR MAY. KHLESTOV SPOKE AT LENGTH ON PROBLEMS RELATED TO CSCE BASKET IIIM ON MBFR, KHLESTOV REPEATED STANDARD POSITIONS. HE THOUGH THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN POSITION. KHLESTOV STRESSED IT WAS PARTICULARLY INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO HIM THAT THE WEST WAS NOT WILLING TO REDUCE FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES IN PARALLEL. HE FOUND THE WESTERN SECOND PHASE CONCEPT VERY UNCLEAR AND UNCERTAIN, EVEN AS TO TYPES OF FORCES REDUCED. KHLESTOV SAID THE FRG FORCE REORGANIZATION PLAN, WITH ITS REDCUTION, MADE THE

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WESTERN RELUCTANCE TO REDUCE NATIONAL FORCES PARTICULARLY STRANGE. THIS ISSUE OF COVERAGE OF EUROPEAN FORCES IN KHLESTOV'S VIEW WAS THE GREATEST PROBLEM FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. KHLESTOV FELT THE INTERESTS OF THE FLANK STATES HAD BEEN WELL TAKEN CARE OF BY THE STATEMENTS OF BOTH SIDES; THEY SHOULD NOW BE SATISFIED AND HELP THE CONFERENCE COME TO AGREEMENT. KHLESTOV SAID THERE WAS NO FOREIGN AIR AND GROUND FORCES IN NORWAY AND DENMARK, UNLIKE ITALY AND GREECE, BUT BELIEVED THERE WERE FOREIGN NAVAL FORCES IN NORWAY. THE NORWEGIAN REP DENIED THIS.

12. UK REP CALLED ATTENTION OF GROUP TO PRAVDA ARTICLE ON DEC. 2 DESCRIBING THE FIRST MONTH OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE DISTRIBUTED A TRANSLATION, AND COMMENTED THAT THIS ARTICLE, THE FIRST OFFICIAL SOVIET REFERENCE TO MBFR SINCE THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS, WAS REMARKABLY MILD AND POSITIVE IN ITS TONE. IT HAD AVOIDED REFERENCE TO THE OCT. 27 BREZHNEV STATEMENT AND TO THE SOVIET POSITION THAT FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED SIMULTANEOUSLY. FRG REP (BEHRENDT) COMMENTED THAT A DAY OR TWO LATER, AN EDITORIAL ON THE SUBJECT HAD APPEARED IN ISVESTIA WHICH HAD BEEN SHARPER AND MORE POLEMICAL.

13. GROUP THEN TURNED TO AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POLISH AND BULGARIAN STATEMENTS MADE IN THE DEC. 5

PLENARY. US DEPREP OBSERVED THAT HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE POLISH STATEMENT THAT THEIR GREATEST CONCERN ABOUT THE ALLIED PROPOSAL WAS THE ABSENCE OF NATIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS FROM PHASE 1, AND THE NEED TO SCHEDULE SUCH REDUCTIONS. THIS POINT HAD NOW BEEN RAISED IN PLENARIES IN TERMS WHICH APPEARED TO CONFIRM INDICATION IN BILATERALS OF EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE ALLIED TWO-PHASE APPROACH. THE EAST WAS APPARENTLY WILLING TO DISCUSS THE ALLIED PHASED APPROACH ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY AT A PRICE, AND ALLIES SHOULD REFLECT ON THIS ADDITIONAL APPARENT HINT NOW IN PLENARY FORM. GREEK REP (DOUNTAS) RECALLED THAT SOVIET STATEMENT IN THE PREVIOUS (NOV. 28) PLENARY HAD STRESSED THAT SOVIETS COULD NOT ACCEPT PUTTING OFF NATIONAL REDUCTIONS "INDEFINITELY". BELGIAN REP (ADRIAENSSEN) OBSERVED THAT POLISH REMARKS CONFIRMED HIS IMPRESSION FROM KHLESTOV

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THAT THE SOVIETS WISHED TO LINK ALLIED FIRST PHASE TO THEIR 1975 TARGET DATE. HE HAD ALSO BEEN STRUCK BY POLISH STATEMENT'S HARSH WORDS FOR THE RESERVATIONS ALLIES HAD MADE REGARDING NOT INTERFERING WITH FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

14. CANADIAN REP OBSERVED THAT THE BULGARIAN STATEMENT HAD BEEN NOTEWORTHY FOR ITS STATEMENT THAT A REDUCTION AREA WAS AGREED, AND ALSO FOR ITS EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO NATO. CANADIAN REP ALSO AGREED WITH OBSERVATIONS MADE BY US DEPREP. GREEK REP ASKED FOR EXPLANATION OF NEW EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO REFER EXPLICITLY TO NATO AS IN POLISH AND BULGARIAN STATEMENTS (FRG REP POINTED OUT THAT SOVIETS HAD DONE SO IN THEIR STATEMENT A WEEK EARLIER). SUGGESTION WAS MADE THAT THIS USAGE MIGHT BE INTENDED TO INCLUDE FRANCE. FRG REP NOTED THAT GDR WOULD MAKE STATEMENT IN DEC. 7 PLENARY.

15. BELGIAN REP NOTED THAT THE OTHER SIDE APPEARS INCREASINGLY ANXIOUS TO KEEP THE NEGOTIATIONS GOING. UK REP AGREED, AND SUGGESTED THAT REASON WAS THAT SOVIETS HAD MADE NO PROGRESS SO FAR ON TWO OBJECTIVES: TO HINDER THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION, AND TO REDUCE THE BUNDESWEHR. UK REP SUGGESTED THAT ALLIES SHOULD SELL ANY CONCESSIONS DEARLY ON THESE SOVIET OBJECTIVES. NETHERLANDS REP ASKED WHAT COMPENSATION THE ALLIES COULD EXPECT FOR SUCH CONCESSIONS. NOTHING LESS THAN A COMMON CEILING WOULD BE ADEQUATE. UK REP REPLIED THAT ALLIES COULD MAKE NO CONCESSIONS WHATEVER THAT WOULD TEND TO HINDER THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DEFENSE COOPERATION. ON THE SECOND SOVIET OBJECTIVE -- ASSURANCE OF FRG REDUCTIONS WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME, -- THE ALLIES MIGHT GIVE SOMETHING IN THE FORM OF AN AGREED LINK BETWEEN PHASES ONE AND TWO. BUT THIS SHOULD NOT BE DONE YET, AND THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DEMAND IN EXCHANGE WOULD BE A GOOD SUBJECT FOR STUDY OVER RECESS.

16. FRG REP ADDED THAT HE TOO HAD BEEN STRUCK BY SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE LINK IN THE POLISH STATEMENT.

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THIS MIGHT BE A POINT OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO POLAND, BUT IN ONE BILATERAL, THE POLISH REPS HAD REMARKED ON HOW EASILY THE SOVIETS HAD ACCEPTED POLISH VIEWS THAT BUNDESWEHR AND OTHER EUROPEAN FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED FROM THE OUTSET DURING PACT CONSULTATIONS THE PAST SUMMER. FRG REP SUGGESTED THAT GROUP THINK ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE LINK BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES. AFTER ALL, NAC AGREED GUIDANCE REQUIRED ALLIES TO NEGOTIATE THIS WITH EAST. ITALIAN ACTING REP (TALIANI) OPINED THAT THIS LINK WILL BE THE MAJOR ISSUE OF THE NEXT MONTHS, AND URGED THE GROUP NOT TO MOVE TOO FAST ON IT AND TO BE CERTAIN TO GET SOMETHING IN RETURN. US REP AGREED, NOTING THAT A CLEAR DISTINCTION SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN INDICATING SOME READINESS AS MENTIONED BY FRG REP TO DISCUSS THE LINK AT SOME FUTURE

UNSPECIFIED POINT AND ACTUALLY GETTING INTO THE DETAILS OF CLARIFYING THE LINK FOR THE SOVIETS, THE LATTER SHOULD BE DONE CONSIDERABLY LATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN JUSTIFIED BY ACTUAL PROGRESS.

17. FRG REP SUGGESTED THAT AT SOME STAGE THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE PACT THAT THE SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT MUST NOT INCLUDE SUBCEILINGS ON THE FORCES OF EACH PARTICIPATING NATION. PERHAPS THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN THE NEXT ALLIED PRESENTATION. THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO MOVE INTO PHASE TWO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE HOPE THAT SUBCEILINGS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. THE BEST WAY TO PRESENT THIS POINT TO THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE TO COMBINE IT WITH SOME FORTHCOMINGNESS OF CLARIFYING THE LINK. US REP OBJECTED THAT TO TAKE THIS COURSE WOULD GET ALLIES RIGHT INTO THE MIDDLE OF THE CONTENT OF THE SECOND PHASE. ALLIES SHOULD EXERT ALL EFFORTS TO AVOID BEING DRAGGED INTO NEGOTIATING TWO PHASES SIMULTANEOUSLY. US DEPREP ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO MOVE FROM THE PRESENT ABSTRACT DEBATE ABOUT COVERAGE OF EUROPEAN FORCES INTO ACTUAL NEGOTIATING ON PHASE ONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE MORE ALLIES TALK ABOUT THIS PROBLEM, THE MORE EASTERN APPETITES WILL INCREASE, AND THE MORE PHASE TWO WILL MOVE INTO THE CENTER OF NEGOTIATIONS. BELGIAN REP OBSERVED THAT THE ALLIES' MAIN JOB WAS TO CONSOLIDATE A STONE WALL ON THE ISSUE OF
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INTERFERENCE WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. THE CLARIFICATION THAT FRG REP SUGGESTED MIGHT, AT THIS POINT, GIVE A MISLEADING IMPRESSION OF FLEXIBILITY. FRG REP RESPONDED THAT ALLIES HAD ALREADY GIVEN FIGURES ON PHASE TWO REDUCTIONS, WHICH WAS GETTING INTO DETAIL. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT PHASE ONE WOULD SET NATIONAL CEILINGS FOR US AND SOVIETS, AND ALLIES MUST WARN PACT THAT THIS COULD NOT BE A PRECEDENT FOR PHASE TWO. NETHERLANDS REP RESPONDED THAT, WHILE HE AGREED THAT ALLIES COULD NOT ACCEPT NATIONAL SUBCEILINGS IN PHASE TWO, THE QUESTION WAS WHEN TO PUT THIS POINT TO THE EAST. DOING SO NOW WOULD MAKE PHASE ONE FAR LESS PALATABLE TO THE EAST. FRG REP SAID ISSUE MUST STILL BE KEPT IN MIND. US DEPREP POINTED OUT THAT THIS ISSUE HAD ARISEN IN NAC DISCUSSION OF OUTLINE PROPOSAL, AND NAC HAD DECIDED NOT TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO AGGREGATES.

18. US REP OBSERVED THAT ON PREVIOUS DAY THE GROUP HAD RECEIVED AN EXCERPT FROM AN ARTICLE IN THE FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON) WHICH INACCURATELY REPORTED THAT THE US SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAD SAID THAT THE US WOULD WITHDRAW 3,900 MEN FROM EUROPE. IN FACT, THE SECDEF HAD SAID THAT 59 BASES WOULD BE CLOSED IN TWELVE COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE, WHICH WOULD SAVE SOME 3,900 SPACES IN ALL

THREE SERVICES. HE HAD CHECKED, AND NONE OF THESE SAVINGS
WOULD INVOLVE WITHDRAWALS FROM THE REDUCTIONS AREA.
CHAIRMAN THANKED US REP FOR THIS EXPLANTATION.

19. GROUP WILL MEET AGAIN ON AFTERNOON OF DECEMBER 6.HUMES
UNQUOTE RUSH

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 10 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ALLIANCE, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, MEETING REPORTS, MILITARY AGREEMENTS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 11 DEC 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: hilburpw
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973STATE242551
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR/EE WSSHEPARD:DK
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731256/abqcekfl.tel
Line Count: 441
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: hilburpw
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 06 SEP 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <06-Sep-2001 by martinml>; APPROVED <01-Oct-2001 by hilburpw>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING, DEC 5, 1973
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: BUDAPEST
BUCHAREST
SOFIA
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005